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0-14 years: 44.6% (male 7,095,117/female 6,763,759)
15-64 years: 53% (male 8,436,716/female 8,008,463)
65 years and over: 2.4% (male 366,642/female 386,300)
Area 647,500 sq km
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total: 160.23 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 164.77 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 155.45 deaths/1,000 live births








Warsaw 2000: Not invited
Seoul 2002: Not invited
Santiago 2005: Participant
Timeline of Recent Major Events in Afghanistan:
• 2004 October – Hamid Karzai elected president.
• 2005 June – A suicide bomber blows himself up in a mosque in Kandahar, killing
17 people, including the police chief of the capital Kabul. Terrorist and insurgent
violence escalates in Afghanistan with Iraq-style attacks.
• 2005 September - First parliamentary and provincial elections in more than 30
years; winners include a series of influential coalitions of former mujahedeen and
Taliban commanders, communists, tribal nationalists, royalists, warlords, and
urban professionals.
• 2005 December - New parliament holds its inaugural session.
• 2006 January - More than 30 people are killed in a series of suicide attacks in
southern Kandahar province.
• 2006 February - International donors meeting in London pledge more than $10bn
in reconstruction aid over five years.
1 Principal author: Bertelsmann Stiftung




• 2006 May - Violent anti-U.S. protests in Kabul, the worst since the fall of the
Taliban in 2001, erupt after a U.S. military vehicle crashes and kills several
people.
• 2006 May-August - Scores of people are killed in battles between Taliban fighters
and Afghan and coalition forces in the south during an offensive known as
Operation Mountain Thrust.
• 2006 July 31- NATO troops assume command of all military operations in
southern Afghanistan, beginning one of the biggest ground operations in the
alliance's history.
• 2006 August – According to Western anti-narcotics officials in Kabul,
Afghanistan produces a record opium harvest.
• 2006 October - NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of
Afghanistan, taking command in the east of the country from a US-led coalition
force.
2. BACKGROUND
Afghanistan, relative to democratic development, has become a country of contrasts.
Afghanistan has made great strides since the demise of the Taliban regime. In less than
five years, the country hosted the first democratic elections in its history; drafted and
ratified a new constitution; and has laid the foundation for numerous seemingly
democratic institutions. Yet much is left to be accomplished before Afghanistan can be
considered a democratic nation.
Much of the early foundation for Afghan democracy was formalized by the 2002
Loya Jirga, or Grand Assembly, where debate on the constitution was dominated by
mujahedeen and warlords without open discussion, leading many to argue that the initial
attempt to formulate Afghanistan’s democratic roadmap was anything but democratic.3
Moreover, while a new era of stability was expected after the fall of the Taliban,
Afghanistan is now embroiled in an intense, violent and growing insurgency. Finally and
extremely disturbing, Afghanistan’s economy has been captured by opium production
and trafficking. The significant correlation between the burgeoning opium market
(approximately 87 percent of the world’s heroin is produced in Afghanistan4) and Afghan
corruption is damaging democratic development. Current estimates posit that opium
accounts for between 35-60 percent of the national economy.
Nearly continuous warfare including a fratricidal civil war and Taliban rule in
Afghanistan has overwhelmed state institutions and foundations, fractured the economy
and shattered traditional societal relationships over the last three decades. Any
assessment of Afghanistan’s progress in becoming a functioning democracy must
3
“Unfortunately from the start, the Loya Jirga was regarded as manipulated and unrepresentative by many
in Afghanistan, particularly by the powerful warlords.” For example, see: Geoff Thompson, “Constitutional
teething problems in Afghanistan” in: PM, Radio National, June 18, 2003, transcript at
http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2003/s882967.htm (accessed on September 11, 2006).
4 See: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Government of Afghanistan’s Counter Narcotics
Directorate, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005, November 2005.
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consider the continuing implications of the maelstrom of incessant internecine conflict
that the country has experienced.
A significant and profound challenge facing any Afghan government is the creation
of a cohesive nation state. As suggested by Larry Diamond, “you can’t build a democratic
state unless you first have a state, and the essential condition for a state is that it must
have an effective monopoly over the means of violence.”5 Such a condition does not
presently exist in Afghanistan. The country is not only locked in the midst of a violent
and strengthening insurgency, but also marred by warlordism and the persistence of
private militia, especially at the regional, provincial and district levels, all of which are
challenging state rehabilitation. Further complicating the situation is the fact that
Afghanistan has virtually no democratic tradition at the national level. Many Afghans
connote “democracy” with the People’s Democratic Party and its communist regime
when Afghanistan was known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
Other significant challenges to democratic development in Afghanistan include
ethno-linguistic fragmentation and overcoming Afghan society’s deep tribal and clan-
based distrust of a central authority. Since the creation of the modern state of
Afghanistan, the Pashtun tribal confederation, which forms the largest demographic bloc
within Afghanistan, has ruled the country for all but a few years. This phenomenon has
led to entitlement expectations by the Pashtuns as well as to deep-rooted anti-Pashtun
feelings among the non-Pashtun ethno-linguistic groups. Unlike other ethnic groups, the
Pashtuns stress a pronounced tribal structure and code at the expense of the state. The
Pashtun dominance of government has created an atmosphere of tension between them
and the remaining ethnic groups in Afghanistan, mainly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.
These tensions have lead to conflict as well as the introduction of repressive measures to
quell the power struggle of these ethnic minority groups.
Afghanistan faces a number of other obstacles to its democratic development:
• The continued powerful societal role played by warlords and private militias with
massive arms stocks despite the demobilization of many militias.
• A feeble economy that ranks Afghanistan 173 of 178 of the countries by the UN’s
human development report.6
• One of the lowest literacy rates in the world. Only 28.7 per cent of Afghans over
the age of 15 can read and write.7
5 Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring
Democracy to Iraq. New York: Times Books 2005, p. 305.
6 Afghanistan along with Somalia was unable to produce accurate enough data to be ranked in UN
Development Program’s annual Human Development Report. Using the data available the UNDP,
however, Afghanistan’s National Human Development Report 2004 estimated that Afghanistan would have
ranked 173 out of 178. See: UNDP, Afghanistan: National Human Development Report 2004, New York:
United Nations 2004. Also see: Dan McDougall, “The new Afghanistan is a myth. It's time to go and get a
job abroad” in: The Observer, February 5, 2006.
7 Anders Wirak, Abdul Star Hayat, Titus Tenga, Bente Nilson, and Hilde Thyness, Afghanistan: Norwegian




Democratic Institutions and Processes
Free, fair and periodic elections, by universal and equal suffrage, conducted by
secret ballot8
Presidential Election. On October 9, 2004 the presidential election took place with 18
eligible candidates on the Afghan presidential ballot.9 Hamid Karzai was elected with
55.4 percent of the vote, three times more votes than any other candidate. While there
were complaints about voter intimidation (especially in the Pashtun south and east),
voting procedures and allegations of multiple voting combined with irregularities in
counting, an Impartial Panel of Election Experts concluded that the outcome had not been
affected.10
The results of the presidential election suggest that the traditional ethnic splits in the
country remain at the forefront of Afghan politics. No candidate received significant
support outside of his particular ethno-linguistic group. Hamid Karzai was elected with a
majority of the total vote, but not with a majority of the vote from any ethnic group
outside his own dominant Pashtun base. His claim to represent a truly national candidate
with support across ethnic lines is not borne out by these data. This analysis suggests that
Afghanistan faces an extremely difficult challenge of unifying a fragmented society and
fostering the development of a national identity.
Afghan Legislative Elections. Afghan legislative elections (including district
elections), initially planned to be held simultaneously with the presidential elections,
were eventually rescheduled for September 18, 2005. Approximately 6,000 candidates11
sought approximately 390 parliamentary (Wolesi Jirga) and 217 provincial council
positions.12 The use of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral formula in these
legislative elections meant that each Afghan voter cast a single vote even though there
would be multiple members to serve their respective electoral district. This system in
effect marginalized and limited the potential influence of the political parties. Barnett
Rubin writing in the International Herald Tribune suggested, “[t]his system in fact
virtually guarantees the formation of an unrepresentative parliament of local leaders with
no incentive to cooperate with one another or the government. It places a premium on
8 The analysis presented here and in some of the following sections are drawn from a detailed independent
analysis of recent Afghan elections and post-conflict development, see: Thomas H. Johnson,
“Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War” in: Central Asian Survey
25.1/2 (2006), forthcoming.
9 This section draws upon previous work, see: Thomas H. Johnson, “Democratic Nation Building in the Arc
of Crisis: The Case of the Presidential Election in Afghanistan”, pp. 125-146 in James Russell (ed.),
Critical Issues in Middle East Security: Stability after Saddam? New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006.
10 See International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 39 (June 2, 2005) “Political Parties in Afghanistan”
and “Report of the Impartial Panel Concerning Presidential Election,” November 1, 2004. Available at
http://www.unama-afg.org (Link currently inactive).
11 Forty-five candidates were refused because of connections with armed groups or for not giving up their
government jobs, although an alleged 207 other militia leaders were legislative candidates.
12 During March 2005 it was announced that the district elections were postponed until 2006 (exact date to
be determined) because of complications in the determination of individual district boundaries. This




vote buying and intimidation, since swinging even a small number of votes can easily
affect the outcome.”13
Final results were delayed by accusations of fraud and were not declared until
November 12, 2005.14 The election results suggested that the 249-member Wolesi Jirga
consists of five broad, possibly overlapping groups: first, former mujahedeen, including
approximately 40 members of Hizb-e Islami15; second, independents, technocrats and
those tribal or regional leaders who are not presently affiliated with any of the established
Afghan political parties; third, 11 former communists and other leftists many of whom
have joined mujahedeen parties or remnants of the Taliban; fourth, former members of
the Taliban establishment; and fifth, former ministers and six deputy ministers of the
government, many of whom had been dismissed by Karzai as he attempted to consolidate
power over the previous three years.16 Women won 68 seats, slightly more than the 25
percent representation guaranteed under the new electoral system, a significant
accomplishment.
Because of SNTV and the prohibition of meaningful political party participation,
many candidates won virtually by chance. For example, in Wardak Province where 69
candidates competed for five Wolesi Jirga seats, the leading vote getter (Abdul Reza
Rezaee) received 10 percent of the vote. In Kabul, the most populous province in the
country with more than three million people, 1,193,472 registered voters cast only
399,810 valid votes (35 percent). Thirty of the 33 winning candidates in Kabul received
from 2.5 to 0.4 percent of the vote. Forty-six percent of the Kabuli electorate voted for
losing candidates which would not be surprising if only two or three candidates where
running; but in Kabul 387 candidates were vying for legislative positions. The aggregate
nationwide votes collected by all Wolesi Jirga winners represented only 35.8 percent of
the total vote.17 Put another way, 64.2 percent of the Afghan voters supported losing
candidates.
Multipartyism, the freedom to form democratic political parties that can participate
in elections
The Afghan Constitution, deliberately vague on the role of political parties, allows for
political parties to be established so long as their charters “do not contradict the principles
of Islam,” and do not have affiliations with foreign countries. The Political Parties Law
that was later enacted by the Karzai government provided the procedures for the legal
registration of political parties in accordance with the constitution. This law prohibits
13 Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan: The Wrong Voting System” in: International Herald Tribune, March 16,
2005.
14 For full results of the election, see: Joint Election Management Body (JEMB) at
http://www.results.jemb.org/home.asp (accessed on September 11, 2006).
15 The party was registered in August 2005 with the Justice Ministry by its new leader Khaled Faruqi, a
former commander of Hekmatyar. Faruqi won a seat in the Wolsei Jirga.
16 The most prominent member of the ousted Taliban regime, former Foreign Minister Mawlawi Wakil
Ahmad Mutawakkil, fared very poorly in his candidacy in Kandahar Province. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an
ethnic Pashtun and a Karzai supporter who is an extreme Islamist and alleged war criminal as well as
terrorist supporter, also won a parliament seat from Kabul with a bear minimum of votes.
17The aggregated vote of all Wolesi Jirga winners was 2,225,068; 6,207,843 total votes were cast.
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political parties whose charters are “opposed to the principles of the holy religion Islam,”
which is problematic since Islamic principles are open to interpretation.18
There is no dearth of political parties in Afghanistan, as over 70 parties have formally
registered with the government. However, the gap between political party and political
power is tremendous. According to the International Crisis Group, “[t]he government has
built a hostile environment for political parties, including electoral laws and decrees that
render such groupings all but obsolete.”19
As suggested above, political party participation in the Afghan legislative elections
was negated by rules adopted for the elections. On May 25, 2004, President Karzai
signed a law that was to govern the elections.20 This law provided that the Afghan
population would vote for individual candidates rather than political parties in the
parliamentary elections. Candidates were not allowed to run under a party banner.
Candidates could be independent, nominated or endorsed by a political party, but political
party symbols could not appear on the ballot.
The failure of the Afghan Government to actively engage and promote Afghan
political parties will inhibit democratic development and enhance the probability of
praetorian behavior, corruption and financing of the elections by external elements.21
Guaranteeing that everyone can exercise his or her right to take part in the
government of his or her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives
Voter registration—a key indicator of citizens’ democratic participatory behavior—
soared in anticipation of free and fair presidential elections with most eligible voters
registering even under the cloud of Taliban threats to kill registrants.22 Although nine
million of the eligible 9.8 eligible voters registered, the registration process was marked
by blatant irregularities, such as 140 percent voter-registration rates in three provinces,23
including the provinces that lie along the Afghan-Pakistan border where Taliban and
insurgent attacks have been frequent. Six other predominantly Pashtun provinces
(Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunar, Ghazni, Helmand and Kandahar) were also reportedly
over-registered, compared to only three predominantly non-Pashtun provinces – Balkh,
Badghis and Herat. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
refused to send election monitors to Afghanistan, because they believed that “the present
conditions in Afghanistan [were] significantly below the minimum regarded by OSCE ...
as necessary for credible election observation.”24
Fifty-seven percent of the Afghan population registered and were eligible to vote in
the legislative elections. Three provinces had over 100 percent voter registration. These
18 International Crisis Group, “Political Parties in Afghanistan”, Asia Briefing No. 39 (June 2, 2005). 
19 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan Elections: Endgame Or New Beginning?”, Asia Report No.101
(July 21, 2005), p. 3.
20
“New Afghan Election Law Endorsed” in: Kabul Radio, FBIS No. IAP20040527000095, May 27, 2004;
“Afghan Leader Karzai Endorses Election Law”, Kabul Hindokosh News Agency, FBIS No.
IAP20040527000099, May 27, 2004.
21 See, for example: International Crisis Group, “Political Parties in Afghanistan”, Asia Briefing No. 39
(June 2, 2005). 
22 Craig Charney, “Afghan Success Story”, in: Washington Post, July 30, 2004, A19.




data probably suggest voter fraud in the primarily Tajik home province of Karzai’s major
opponent Qanooni and in the primarily Pashtun province of Paktika. The latter also had
significant over registration in the presidential election and overwhelmingly voted for
President Karzai (88.4 percent). The over-registration did not lead to additional votes in
Panjshir. Only 35 percent of Panjshiri “registered” voters actually voted in the election.
The legislative election voter turnout – 49.8 percent – was substantially lower than in
the October 2004 presidential election. Turnout was highest in the north - generally over
60 percent - and lowest (below 30 percent) in some of the Pashtun-speaking south-eastern
areas where the Taliban insurgency is strongest. Surprisingly low voter turnout (34.5
percent) in Kabul is especially troubling considering that this urban populace is the
highest educated and most politically sophisticated in the country. Voter intimidation was
also reported to have been widespread, especially in the conservative south.
The impact of narcotics and corruption on Afghan democracy
Ultimately, the most problematic dynamic facing Afghanistan’s attempt to
democratize is its blossoming opium industry. The large illicit drug economy plays a
significant role in undermining government stability, both through corruption and
through this economy’s funding of anti-government insurgencies to include the Taliban.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank are the first two
organizations to apply an Afghanistan-specific context for their analysis of the opiate
economy and the policies that are being used to confront it.25 The World Bank in
particular has paid attention to the connections between “warlord” anti-government
interest and the trafficking portion of the opiate economy.
The opium economy and the influx of narco-money have contributed to the spread of
corruption into all spheres of government. Drug trafficking, corruption and warlords are
the three closely linked problems. Warlords, whose organizations span the whole of
Afghanistan, transcend ethnic divisions and control much of the lucrative drug trafficking
networks, which have led them to reassert their control at the local level. Narco-
associated corruption permeates Afghan society with corruption being especially
pronounced in the judiciary and police.26
The projects designed to provide alternative livelihood to the local farmers in the
south largely failed due to poor implementation, caused in large part by the lack of solid
collaboration between the Afghan Government and internationally funded programs. In
25 See World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region,
Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty--A Country Economic Report,
(Report No. 29551-AF, September 9, 2004), p.87; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
The Opium Economy in Afghanistan 2003, (UNODC, 2003) at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications
/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf (accessed on September 12, 2006); United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, UNODC, Vienna: November 2004 at http://www.unodc.org/
pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf, p. 71 (accessed on September 12, 2006). See also Barnett
Rubin, Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry, New York: New York University Center on
International Cooperation 2004; Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzda and Abby Stoddard, Afghanistan 2005
and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document, New York University Center on
International Cooperation 2005, for the Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations.




addition, forceful eradication strategies have been unpopular with local communities and
have added to the lack of popularity of the Afghan Government.
Rule of Law
While Islam is central to the constitution, its specific role remains ill-defined. The
country is officially designated as an Islamic republic, not a secular state. The
constitution does require the state to abide by its international agreements, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has a clear provision on freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. The potentially most arbitrary clause in the constitution
states that in “Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the
sacred religion of Islam.” The inclusion of the term “belief” confers extraordinary power
on those interpreting the laws.
The constitution established a strong presidential system in which the president serves
as both head of state and head of government.27 The constitution also established a
bicameral legislature and a Supreme Court with high courts and appeals courts. It
established no separate religious courts, but powerful Islamists presently are in or have
influence on the emerging Afghan judiciary.
Article 22 of the constitution affirmed women's equality under Afghan law. In stark
contrast to the years of Taliban rule during which Afghan women were subjected to well-
documented, draconian social rules and abuses, the adopted Afghan constitution also
gave particular emphasis to the role of woman in the legislature. The lower house, the
Wolesi Jirga, consists of 220-250 parliamentarians and is proportional to the population
of each of the 34 provinces. From each of the 34 provinces an average of at least two
female candidates should become a member of the Wolesi Jirga, which at a minimum
should guarantee 27% women in the assembly (68 seats). For the House of Elders, the
Meshrano Jirga, the President appoints one-third of the members, and 50 percent of these
should be women. A minimum of 17% of the seats of the Meshrano Jirga must therefore
be occupied by women.28
Separation of powers, independence of the judiciary
Overall, the separation of powers among the various branches of government has
been firmly established. The 2004 constitution structures Afghanistan’s government as a
strong presidential system.29 Article 82 provides for a bicameral legislature made up of an
upper house or House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga) and lower house or House of the
People (Wolesi Jirga). Membership of the lower house is through popular election
proportioned by population amongst the provinces. Membership in the upper house is
decided upon by the president, the provincial councils, and the district councils.30
27 For the entire text of the constitution see: http://www.afghangovernment.com/2004constitution.htm
(accessed on September 11, 2006).
28 International IDEA and Stockholm University, Global Database of Quotas for Women, available at
http://www.quotaproject.org/displayCountry.cfm?CountryCode=AF (accessed on September 12, 2006).
29 2004 Constitution, Articles 63(11), 71, and 77.
30 2004 Constitution, Articles 83 and 84.
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The next institutional body enshrined in the 2004 constitution is the Loya Jirga,
which Article 111 gives the power of constitutional amendments and impeachment of the
president. While the body is made up of all the institutions of the state, the national
assembly is the only body with voting rights.31 Finally, Article 116 establishes the
Supreme Court as the highest judicial authority. The primary power of judicial review is
granted to the Supreme Court via Article 121.
Checks on presidential power are also codified in the 2004 constitution. While Article
94 grants veto power to the president regarding legislation, the Wolesi Jirga has the right
to review the matter again and approve legislation with a two-thirds vote. Another check
on presidential powers granted to the Wolesi Jirga in Article 117 is the endorsement of
the selection of Supreme Court Justices by the president. The Wolesi Jirga is also granted
checking powers over the executive department as Article 92 codifies the no-confidence
voting procedure. Any member of the cabinet may be summoned to the house by having
only 20 percent of its members propose an inquiry; a majority must approve dismissal.
An independent judiciary has still not been recognized in Afghanistan. The judiciary
is still dominated by the Ulama (Muslim scholars) and “the lack of judicial reform has
become a bottleneck for security, governance, and economic development”.32
Human Rights
Recent events in Afghanistan put into question the success of its human rights
codification. Afghanistan is one of only nine countries in which the conversion from
Islam is a crime punishable by death.33 In February 2006 Abdul Rahman, an Afghan
citizen, was arrested for converting from Islam to Christianity and potentially faced the
death penalty.34 His conversion was ruled by an Afghan judge as a crime under
Afghanistan's Shariah laws.35 The case against Rahman drew considerable international
attention and pointed to the apparent contradictions in Afghanistan’s constitution, which
requires the state to abide by its international agreements. These include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which has a clear provision on freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. At the same time, the constitution recognizes the Hanafi school
of Islamic jurisprudence, which mandates the death penalty for an apostate. Under heavy
international pressure, the Afghan court eventually ruled that Rahman was potentially
mentally unfit to stand trial and returned the case to prosecutors citing “investigative
gaps.” Rahman then left Afghanistan for Italy where he was offered asylum. This case
clearly brought to question the viability or reality of Afghan’s “freedom of religion.”
31 Ibid., Article 110(1).
32 Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Transition to Normalcy” in: Council Special
Reports, No. 12 (March 2006), New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p. 24.
33 See Center for Religious Freedom, http://www.freedomhouse.org.
34
“Fears over Afghan covert trial” in: BBC News, March 22, 2006, www version at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south_asia/4831426.stm (accessed on September 11, 2006).
35 Two other Afghan converts to Christianity were arrested in March 2006, though, for security reasons,
locals have asked that their names and locations not be released. See: Paul Marshall, “The case of the
Afghan convert is not unique” in: The Weekly Standard, 011.28 (April 10, 2006).
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Freedom of the Afghan press
While fairly strict registration requirements remain in place, authorities have granted
more than 250 licenses to independent publications, and several dozen private radio
stations and eight television stations are now broadcasting in Afghanistan. While national
and local governments continue to own or control a substantial part of the printed and
electronic media, reporting is generally balanced. Afghans have unlimited and
unrestricted access to the Internet and to international radio broadcasts, upon which many
Afghans rely for information. The majority of media outlets, however, remain dependent
on the state, political parties or international donors for financial support.36 This has led
to serious challenges over the limits to freedom of the press. The arrest and verdict
against Ali Mohaqiq Nasab, the editor of the magazine Huquq-e san (Women's Rights) is
a case in point. Nasab was arrested for blasphemy in October 2005 after the magazine he
publishes wrote that apostasy is not a crime that should be punished by death. In the same
edition of his magazine, another article “spoke out against the practice of punishing
adultery with 100 lashes and demanded that men and women be treated as equals under
Islamic law.” Nasab’s sentence was eventually reduced on appeal to six months—three
months and nine days of which were suspended. 37
The Reporters without Borders’ 2006 Annual Report on Afghanistan posits that:
“religious conservatives, who stress the ‘Islamic’ nature of the 2004 Constitution, [have]
attempted to silence all critical voices…The Supreme Court and the Council of the
Ulemas, both bastions of conservatism, are the main bodies resisting the emergence of
pluralism in news and information.”38 Meanwhile Freedom House in their 2005 Freedom
of Press Report, rate Afghanistan’s media as “not free” (see Appendix A), and lends
credence to the suggestion that: “Journalists continue to be threatened or harassed by
government ministers, the intelligence service, militias, and others in positions of power
as a result of their reporting. Many practice self-censorship or avoid writing about
sensitive issues such as Islam, national unity, or crimes committed by specific
warlords.”39
Gender Equality
A recent report by Amnesty International argues that “violence against women and
girls in Afghanistan is pervasive; few women are exempt from the reality or threat of
violence. Afghan women and girls live with the risk of: abduction and rape by armed
individuals; forced marriage; being traded for settling disputes and debts; and face daily
discrimination from all segments of society as well as by state officials.”40 This is an
36 Freedom House, Afghanistan Freedom of Press Country Report 2005 at http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=16&year=2005&country=6679 (accessed on September 11, 2006).
37 See Reporters Without Borders, “Editor Ali Mohaqiq Nasab gets two years in prison for blasphemy”,
October 24, 2005 at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article= 15399 (accessed on September 11, 2006)
and; eXchange, “High Court allows release of journalist Ali Mohaqiq Nasab” at
http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/71264/?PHPSESSID=b9888113f9e6810fa26f361641bf3f7e
(accessed on September 11, 2006).
38 Reporters without Borders, 2006 Annual Report on Afghanistan at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3
?id_article=17342 (accessed on September 11, 2006).
39 Freedom House, Afghanistan Freedom of Press Country Report 2005
40 Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Women still under attack -- systematic failure to protect at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa110072005 (accessed on September 11, 2006).
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extremely complex issue involving, in part, strict societal codes invoked by religious and
tribal beliefs that have been used to justify denying women certain basic human rights.
Compounding the problem is the fact that traditional Afghan patriarchal structures are
still evidenced in the judiciary, as well as in many Afghan families.41
Afghan woman in rural areas face the greatest dangers where customary law or
Shariah legal codes still have more authority than democratizing and reform processes. In
addition, much of rural Afghanistan is under the control of tribal chiefs and warlords,
who still have supreme jurisdiction. Afghan women participate rarely in public life and
human rights violations against women extend from threats in everyday life to rape and
murder. According to the Amnesty report, “violence against women is widely tolerated
by the community and widely practiced. It is tolerated at the highest levels of government
and judiciary. […] Impunity seems to exist for such violence.”42
Yet another recent disturbing event that has drawn the ire of human rights groups is
the re-establishment of the Taliban's tal-Amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-Nahi 'an al-Munkir or
Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which was responsible
for implementing a wide range of draconian codes governing public behavior.43 Moulvi
Mohammed Qasim, deputy minister of Haj and Religious Affairs, insists “there is nothing
dangerous in the move to reactivate the department, since its only purpose will be to
preach to the public about morality, a task it already does.”44 Nonetheless, the
reinstatement of this organization as an official government institution, even though it did
not have any major impact yet, has drawn circumspect concern about its purpose and
potentially repressive nature.
4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Afghanistan is one of the world’s great experiments in democracy. While much has been
accomplished, even more needs to be achieved.
• None of the problems facing Afghanistan—a devastated and war-torn country that
is confronted by a violent insurgency—can be addressed effectively without
sustained, equitable economic growth.
• The pace of political and economic reconstruction must be accelerated especially
in the provinces in the east and south of Afghanistan.
41 For a detailed treatment of this plus the general state of women’s life in Afghan society see Ann Jones,
Kabul in Winter: Life Without Peace in Afghanistan. New York: Henry Holt 2006.
42 Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Women still under attack -- systematic failure to protect. See also
George Dwyer, “Report: Domestic Violence Widespread in Afghanistan” in: Voice of America News,
August 24, 2006 at http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-08-24-voa65.cfm (accessed September 11,
2006).
43 Human Rights Watch News, “Afghanistan: Vice and Virtue Department Could Return: Women and Girls
Again at Risk”, July 18, 2006 at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/18/afghan13759.htm (accessed on
September 11, 2006).
44 Aunohita Mojumdar, “Vice and virtue in Afghanistan” in: Asia Times Online, August 10, 2006 at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HH10Df01.html (accessed on September 11, 2006).
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• The extremely destructive Afghan opium economy must be a major focus of
international attention. There is an immediate need to implement strong policies
of sanctions against warlords and militia commanders involved in drug trafficking
and incentives for those who renounce trafficking. A better planned strategy to
provide alternative livelihood to farmers who are suffering from a long draught
and have little options other than growing poppy to feed their families is needed.
• The Afghan government should support broad-based and sustainable political
development by providing government funds to parties so as to reduce the scope
for private interests to buy influence, and by facilitating training to enhance the
participation of women in the political system.
• Future Afghan elections should not follow the Single Non-Transferable Voting
(SNTV) system used in the 2005 legislative election, which marginalizes political
parties that are vital for the development of robust democracy.
• Significant international support is needed for the Afghan legislature. Such
support is not just about finances, resources and training, but also about a
respectful and encouraging interaction domestically and internationally.
• It is vital that Afghanistan have functioning institutions to implement the
decisions of its democratic law-making body. If the national assembly is not seen
to be achieving anything, citizens are likely to lose faith in democracy, allowing
old powerbrokers to reassert themselves outside constitutional structures.
• There is a critical need to ensure implementation of laws highlighting how vital it
is to reform and strengthen the civil service, police and other institutions of state.
• Afghan legislators allegedly still involved with human right abuses must be held
accountable. Commitments to disarmament of militias controlled by certain
legislators must also be rigorously monitored. A code of conduct for members that
includes commitments to disarmament should be instituted.
• Afghanistan is in an unusual situation in that international donors control nearly
all of the country’s financial resources. The international commitments of donors
must be realized. The Afghan legislature must mediate the allocation of resources.
• There is an urgent need to reform the Afghan judiciary.
• The Afghan government must end the patterns of discrimination and violence in
the country—to include, among others steps: publicly and unequivocally
condemning all violence against women; continuing to strengthen the reform of
the criminal justice system including comprehensive training of the judiciary and
police in order to raise standards which promote and protect the rights of women.
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5. STATISTICS AND INDICATORS
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value indicates strong rule of law)
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